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l. INTRODUCTION 
Under general principles of international law, an individual can be held liable for an 
international offense only when the offense is committed on behalf of an international 
state.1 There are a number of notable exceptions to the general rule: Historically, piracy 
has been considered jus cogens,2 and more recently, the Genocide Convention3 and various 
terrorism treaties4 authorize international prosecutions against individuals without regard 
to their relation to a state. Despite these exceptions, the state agency requirement remains 
the central vehicle for distinguishing domestic from international offenses. 
The recent trial of Frenchman Paul Touvier for crimes against humanity has brought 
the issue of state agency to the fore. The Touvier case presents the novel question of 
whether the acts of a public official of one state can be imputed to a second sovereign state 
as acts of that state. The case answers this question in the affirmative: Touvier, the head 
of a division of the French military police in Vichy, was convicted of crimes against 
humanity on the grounds that he was acting to further Germany's policy of racial persecu­
tion during the war.5 By allowing a Frenchman to be tried as a German agent, the Touvier 
court thus indirectly expanded the reach of the concept of crimes against humanity. 
This Article presents a framework for deciding questions of state agency in 
prosecutions for crimes against humanity. It will argue that the correct test for state agency 
would focus on the status of the offender and whether there is an expectation of 
accountability between the offender and the relevant state. The proposed test constitutes 
a rejection of the existing approach to state agency, which focuses instead on the particular 
act and the degree to which it has been authorized by the state, rather than on the actor. 
This Article will suggest that the Touvier court's extension of the notion of state agency can 
be best understood in light of the conception of agency the Article proposes. The Touvier 
case thus reflects a potentially significant evolution in juridical thinking about the relation 
between individual actors and international states. 
l. See Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that customary 
international law "does not reach private, non-state conduct "); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 
776 (D.C. Cir. 1 984) (Edwards, j., concurring) ("I do not believe the law of nations imposes the same responsibility 
or liability on non-state actors . . .  as it does on states and persons acting under color of state law. "); Linder v. 
Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1 452, 1 462 (S.D. Fla. 1 990) (customary international law does not establish cause 
of action for torture against defendants who are not state actors), rev'd on other grounds, 963 F.2d 332 (11 th Cir. 
1992); see also Draft Articles on State Responsibility art. 19, in Report of the International Law Commission to the 
General Assembly on the Work of its Thirty-First Session, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 10 ,  at l, U.N. Doc. 
A/34/lO (1979), reprinted in [ 1979]2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 87, 92, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add . 1  (Part 2) 
[hereinafter Draft Articles I]; M. CHERIF BAsStOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HuMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 235-62 (1992). 
2. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 16 1-62 ( 1820); Lours HENKIN ET AL, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 468 (2d ed. 1987). 
3. Convention on the P revention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 
(entered into force jan. 12, 1951 ). 
4. See, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR 6th 
Comm. , 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N. T.S. 1 77. 
5. judgment of Apr. 20, 1994, Cour d'assises des Yvelines (Fr.); see Alan Riding, Frenchman Convicted of 
Crimes Against the jews in '44, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1994, at A3. 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
For the past fifty years, France has struggled to come to terms with its role in the 
elimination of roughly two-thirds of the Jewish population of Europe. Over 75,000 French 
Jews were deported during the Second World War, of whom approximately 2,500 
survived.6 Not all those deported came from occupied France.? Vichy developed an 
elaborate collaboration with the Nazi deportation program, helping to fill a German quota 
of 40,000 in 1942.8 Jewish families and children without their parents were packed onto 
cattle cars bound for Auschwitz.9 T here is little reason to suppose this collaboration was 
anathema to the Vichy government. Long before collaboration with the Germans had 
begun, Vichy implemented its own anti-semitic policies. In the fall of 1940, Vichy passed 
a series of anti-Semitic laws depriving Jews of the right to hold political office, authorizing 
the internment of foreign Jews, and lifting a ban on articles that fanned racial hatred in the 
press, all without prompting from Germany.10 Moreover, there were concentration camps 
operating in Vichy long before Germany demanded that Vichy assist its deportation 
efforts.ll T housands died of starvation and disease prior to 1942 in a camp thirty miles 
south of Toulouse.12 After 1942, the camp became an assembly point for Jews awaiting 
deportation to Nazi death camps.U 
Despite this record of persecution, Vichy officials have not been widely prosecuted for 
their wartime activities. Immediately after the war, France conducted a handful of trials for 
war crimes, but many defendants had fled the country and other sentences were never 
carried out.14 Petain himself, for example, was sentenced to death for treason in 1945, 
but his sentence was commuted by De Gaulle.15 Rene Bousquet, the chief of police of 
Vichy who played a major role in shaping Vichy's policy of collaboration, was given only 
a five-year sentence, and the sentence was lifted immediately on the basis of unspecified 
"acts of resistance."t6 
Paul Touvier was the head of a division of the Milice, the military police organization 
of VichyY In 1946, he was sentenced to death in absentia for treason and again in 1947 
for exchanging information with the enemy.l8 Aided by various right-wing members of 
the Roman Catholic Church, he remained in hiding until 1967, when the twenty-year 
limitation on execution of judgment expired under French law.19 T hen in 1971, Touvier 
received a presidential pardon from Georges Pompidou. T his provoked a great outcry in 
6. MICHAEL R. MARRUS & RoBERT 0. PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS 343 {1981). 
7. See SusAN ZuccoTTI, THE HoLOCAUST, THE FRENCH, AND THE JEws 208 (1993); see also MARRUS & 
PAXTON, supra note 6, at 255-62. 
8. See PAUL WEBSTER, PETAIN's CRIME: THE Fuu STORY oF FRENCH CoLLABORATION IN THE HoLOCAUST 
108 (1991). 
9. Id. at l-3. 
10. Jd. at 63-69. 
II. Id. at 60. 
12. This was the camp known as "Noe." See id. at 1-2. 
13. See id. at 121-22. 
14. Id. at 199. 
15. Id. at 53. 
16. Id. at 106. 
17. Id. at 204. 
18. BERNARD LAMBERT, DossiERS D'AccusATION: BousQUET, PAPON, TouviER 279-80 (1992). 
19. CoDE DE PROCEDURE PENALE IC. PR. PEN.] art. 763 (Fr.). 
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France, 2o and prompted relatives of Touvier's victims to file an action for cr1mes against 
humanity based on acts for which Touvier had not yet been prosecuted.21 After a number 
of years of evasion, 22 and an attempt to publish a false announcement of his death, 
Touvier was finally arrested in 1989.23 Many years passed while the prosecution 
attempted unsuccessfully to bring Touvier to trial. Finally, last October, the Cour de 
cassation24 issued a ruling that cleared the way for trial, 25 and in April of 1994, Touvier 
was convicted of crimes against humanity.26 The use of the notion of a crime against 
humanity was important in this case, since Touvier could no longer be tried for war crimes 
or for violations of the French Penal Code, both of which are barred by a statute of 
limitations after ten years. 27 Under a 1964 act of parliament, however, crimes against 
humanity are imprescriptible.28 
Touvier's conviction was based on his role in the execution of seven Jewish hostages 
at a cemetery in Rillieux-la-Pape, on June 29, 1944.29 The killings occurred the day after 
20. See Paul Touvier, un collaborateur dans I'Histoire--Chronologie, LE MoNDE, Mar. 17, 1994, Dossier special, 
at III [hereinafter Chronologie] (chronicling Touvier's l ife until 1993). 
21. See Chronologie, supra note 20, at III. Touvier could not be retried for events for which he had already 
been convicted. C. PR. PEN. art. 6, para. I. When the present action was commenced, there were three incidents 
for which Touvier had not been tried: the bombing of a Lyon synagogue in 1943, the assassination of League of 
Human Rights President Victor Basch and his wife, and the execution of seven Jewish hostages at  Rillieux-la-Pape. 
On April 3, 1992, the Cour d'appel de Paris dismissed the first two charges for lack of evidence. Judgment of  Apr. 
13, 1992, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1992 Gazette du Palais [G.P.]. No. 1, at 387, 392, 400 (Fr. ) .  
22. It appears, however, that Touvier d id  not have to  go to  great lengths to  avoid arrest. He remained on 
French soil without interruption from 1944 until 1989, and at various points lived openly in his family house in 
Charmettes with his wife and children. LAMBERT, supra note 17, at 279. 
23. Chronologie, supra note 20, at UI. 
24. The Cour de cassation is France's Supreme Court. 
25. judgment of Oct. 21, 1993, Cass. crim., 1993 Bull. Crim., No. 307, at 770 (Fr.). 
26. judgment of Apr. 20, 1994, Cour d'assises des Yvelines (Fr.) ;  see Riding, supra note 5, at A3. The court 
originally attempted to deny jurisdiction over the case, claiming that the crimes of which Touvier was accused 
involved, among other things, the crime of sharing information with an enemy of war, and that the Cour de securite 
de /'etat (Court of State Security) would therefore be the p roper forum to consider the matter. The court of  
appeals of Lyon affirmed the lower court's lack of jurisdiction, agreeing that the matter had to  be heard by a 
military tribunal. The Cour de cassation, however, vacated the order of the Lyon appeals court, and sent the case 
to the appeals court of Paris. judgment of Feb. 6, 1975, Cass. crim., 1975 G.P., Nos. 124-26, at 310, 311 (Fr. ) .  
The Paris court assumed jurisdiction over the case, but claimed that the law declaring crimes against humanity 
exempt from the ordinary statute of limitations for murder did not apply in this case, because of retroactivity. 
judgment of Oct. 27, 1975, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1976 G.P., Nos. 154-55, at 382, 383 (Fr.). See discussion infra 
note 28. 
27. See MICHELE-LAURE R.ASSAT, DROIT PENAL ET PROCEDURE PENALE 122 (1986). 
28. JouRNAL 0FFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE [j.O.j, Dec. 29, 1964, at 11.788 (Fr.). Prior to 1964, the 
same domestic statute of limitations applied to crimes against humanity as to other crimes under French law. For 
a discussion of the p roblem of prescription as it relates to the notion of crimes against humanity, see Leila S. 
Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the Freru:h Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and 
Back Again, 32 CoLUM . j. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 318 (1994). 
In earlier proceedings, arguments were made to the effect that application of the 1964 law to acts that 
occurred prior to 1964 would be retroactive, and hence unconstitutional. The question turned on whether the 1964 
law altered the nature of the concept of crimes against humanity or merely clarified a p reexisting concept in 
international law. After the question had worked its way through the lower courts, the Cour de cassation said in 
1976 that the matter would have to be decided by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. judgment of June 30, 1976, 
Cass. crim., 1976 G.P., Nos. 322-23, at 699, 700 (Fr. ) .  After three years of deliberation, the Ministry concluded 
that the 1964 statute was simply declarative of the nature of crimes against humanity, and thus that it was not 
retroactive. MICHELE-LAURE RASSAT, DROIT PENAL 215 n.l60 (1987). This decision opened the way for the 
prosecution of both Touvier and Klaus Barbie. 
29. The present litigation began in 1973, when a son of one of the victims filed a complaint before the 
Tribunal de grandes instances de Lyon, the trial court of Lyon, alleging that Touvier was responsible for crimes 
against humanity. 
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members of the resistance had assassinated Philippe Henriot, the Minister of Information 
of Vichy and a rather prorrlinent member of the Milice.30 The killings at Rillieux were 
understood as revenge for Henriot's assassination, 31 and the Milice accepted responsibility 
for it. 3 2  
Among his other duties, Touvier had been in charge of detaining Jewish and political 
prisoners, and the seven murdered at Rillieux were among those under his supervision.33 
He adrrlitted to having personally selected the victims, and to having given the orders to 
the execution team as well as various detailed instructions about how the killings should 
be carried out.34 In his defense, however, Touvier asserted that it was the Germans who 
demanded revenge for the death of Henriot, and that Knab, the Gestapo chief assigned to 
the region of Lyon, had planned a vast reprisal which was to involve the murder of a 
hundred or more Jews. Touvier claimed that his direct superior, De Bourmont, managed 
to convince Knab to leave the matter in the hands of Vichy officials. 35 De Bourmont, 
according to Touvier, then ordered Touvier to organize the execution of thirty Jews 
instead. 3 6  Touvier was able to exercise a sufficient degree of autonomy, he claimed, to 
reduce the number killed still further, from thirty to seven_37 Rather than think of him 
as having killed seven Jews, he argued, he should be thought of as having saved twenty­
three. 3 8 Discussion of the legal sufficiency of a defense of the sort Touvier offered is 
deferred until the Appendix. The body of the Article will focus on the elements of crimes 
against humanity and, in particular, the question of state agency. 
III. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
The concept of crimes against humanity was formally introduced into international 
law by the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Crirrlinals of the 
European Axis, signed by the Allies in London on August 8, 1945. 39 Annexed to the 
Agreement is the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 40 empowering the 
Tribunal to try individuals accused of an international crime, and defining three categories 
of crimes: crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 41 Article 
6 of the Charter provides in relevant part: 
The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof 
for the trial and punishment of the major war crirrlinals of the European Axis 
countries shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the 
interests of the European Ax:is countries, whether as individuals or as members 
of organisations, committed any of the following crimes . .. .  
30. Riding, supra note 5, at A3. 
31. Wexler, supra note 28, at 292. 
32. See Judgment of Apr. 13, 1992, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1992 G.P., No. 1, at 387, 405 (Fr.). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 408. 
35. Lee Yanowitch, Touvier Relives Jewish Executions for Court, REuTERS, Mar. 29, 1994, available in LE<IS, 
World Library, Txtnws File. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Riding, supra note 5, at A3. 
39. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European A..x:is, Aug. 8, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Agreement]. 
40. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 284 [herein�:cer 
Nuremburg Charter]. 
41. Id. art. 6. 
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(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds 
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated.42 
The jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal was not made exclusive. Under the 
Agreement, members of the Allied nations specifically retain the power to conduct trials of 
war criminals in their own courts for crimes committed within their own jurisdictions.43 
Article 55 of the French Constitution, which declares international law superior to 
French domestic law,44 provides the basis for the incorporation of international law into 
French law. The international concept of crimes against humanity could therefore be used 
to prosecute Touvier for violations of international law, despite the fact that he is a French 
national and was tried before French courts for crimes committed on French territory. 
Although no Frenchman had ever been tried for crimes against humanity before, the 
Touvier court did have substantial guidance from the prosecution of Klaus Barbie,45 the 
only other person of any nationality France has tried for crimes against humanity.46 The 
Barbie case thus supplied the Touvier court with its only direct precedent. 
An important preliminary decision of the Cour de cassation in the Barbie case defined 
crimes against humanity as: 
inhuman acts and persecution perpetrated in a systematic way in the name of a 
state engaging in a policy of ideological hegemony, not only against persons in 
virtue of their belonging to a racial or religious community but also against the 
adversaries of this political system, whatever form their opposition takes . . . Y 
This definition breaks down the concept of a crime against humanity into two main 
elements: a material element, i.e. an act requirement, according to which the actor must 
have performed an act of a certain sort, such as those listed in the definition of crimes 
against humanity set forth in the Charter, and a moral element. The moral element, in 
turn, appears to have two components. The first is the requirement that the act have been 
performed "in the name of a State engaging in a policy of ideological hegemony."48 The 
second is a principle of individual responsibility: The agent himself must either have 
committed the acts in question in virtue of the political, racial, or religious identity of the 
victims, or he must have been aware that the victims were selected on that basis.49 The 
first component of the moral element can be further broken down into two sub­
components. The relevant state must in some sense be an illegitimate one; call this the 
42. Jd. 
43. London Agreement, supra note 39, art. 6. 
44. LA CoNsTITUTION art. 55 (Fr.). 
45. Judgment of July 4, 1987, Cour d'assises de Lyon (Fr.); see Nicholas R. Doman, Aftermath of Nuremberg: 
The Trial of Klaus Barbie, 60 Cow. L. REv. 449 (1989). 
46. See Riding, supra note 5, at A3. 
47. Judgment of Dec. 20, 1985, Cass. crim., 1986 BuU. Crim., No. 407, at 1038, 1053 (Fr.) (translation from 
the French); see also Doman, supra note 45, at 453-59. 
48. judgment of Dec. 20, 1985, 1986 Bull. Crim. at 1053. 
49. See )udgme:-tt of june 3, 1983, Cass. crim., 1988 Bull. Crim., No. 246, at 637, 646-47 (Fr.). 
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"nature-of-the-regime" requirement. Additionally, the acts must have been performed on 
behalf of the state in question; call this the "state agency" requirement. 
To summarize, then, the Barbie court's definition of crimes against humanity includes 
the following four criteria: 
(1) an act requirement, 
(2) a principle of individual responsibility, 
(3) a nature-of-the-regime requirement; and 
(4) a state agency requirement. 
We shall consider each in turn. 
The acts that can satisfy the first requirement are those specified in the Charter, 
namely "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population . . .  or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds ... . " 50 In a preliminary hearing in the Touvier case, the Cour d'appel 
found that Touvier satisfied the act requirement, a point which no one appears to have 
contested.s1 
The principle of individual responsibility is a specialized mens rea requirement. The 
mens rea for murder does not require that the killing have been performed from any 
particular motive; it will ordinarily suffice if it was done knowingly or with awareness of 
a substantial risk of death. 52 Crimes against humanity, however, are like crimes of specific 
intent in Anglo-American law:53 They require that the perpetrator have acted from a 
particular motive. In this case, the act must have been performed in order to further a state 
ideology of persecution. 54 Unlike ordinary crimes of specific intent, however, the actor 
himself need not share this ideology; he need only be aware that his acts serve to further 
a state policy of the relevant sort. The Cour d'appel also easily found that Touvier satisfied 
this second requirement, since, by his own admission, 55 he was responsible for selecting 
the victims, and he chose them because they were Jews.56 
The nature-of-the-regime requirement is not a common condition of international 
prosecutions. It is thus difficult to know exactly what the Barbie court had in mind when 
50. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 40, art. 6. 
51. judgment of Apr. 13, 1992, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1992 G.P., No. I, at 408 (Fr.). Touvier's defense could 
be thought of as denying that the act requirement was satisfied, since his claim that the killings were justified by 
necessity, see infra Appendix, can be thought of as denying that the killings amounted to murder. The act 
requirement for crimes against humanity includes murder, rather than just killing, in the way that a national legal 
instrument criminalizing murder would. But it is preferable to think of the necessity defense in this context as a 
plea that one's responsibility for murder should not amount to a crime against humanity, rather than to think of 
necessity as applying to the act of murder itself, since the agent has violated a prohibitory norm even if his conduct 
is justified. 
52. See, e.g., MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 210.2 (1962) (allowing the mens rea requirement for murder to be satisfied 
with a killing performed "knowingly" or "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life"). 
53. For example, forgery under New York law is when "with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, a 
person falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument." N.Y. PENAL LAw§ 170.05 (McKinney 1988). The 
Model Penal Code defines burglary as entering "a building ... with purpose to commit a crime therein .... " 
MoDF.L PENAL CoDE§ 221.1(1) (1962). 
54. See jacques-Bernard Herzog, Contribution ill't!tude de Ia definition du crime contre l'humanitt!, 1947 REVUE 
lNT'L DROIT PENAL 155, 158-61. 
55. judgment of Apr. 13, 1992, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1992 G.P., No. I, at 408 (Fr.). 
56. Further evidence for this lies in the fact that Touvier arranged to have an eighth victim released after it 
was discovered the latter was not jewish. See Riding, supra note 5, at A3. 
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it used the phrase, "a state practicing a political system of ideological hegemony."57 One 
possibility is that the court intended to restrict the category of perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity to agents of states that fail to comport with standards of international law 
generally. Alternatively, the court might have intended to restrict this category to agents 
of states that maintain, more specifically, policies of persecution. Vfhatever the Barbie court 
had in mind, the restriction is clearly meant to rule out international prosecution of 
offenders from countries like France. Although one commentator has called the 
requirement a "blatant attempt[] to exonerate ... the Vichy government from wrong,"58 
it might nevertheless be defensible under general principles of international law. Interna­
tional criminal law should be thought of as helping to fill the gaps left by domestic criminal 
law, authorizing prosecutions where domestic law fails to remedy wrongs. 'vVhere the state 
itself is illegitimate, a wrongful act will go unpunished unless the international community 
steps in. Where a state is not fundamentally illegitimate, its own criminal justice system 
should prosecute the offender, and international law, one might argue, has no grounds for 
intervention. The problem with this argument, however, is that substantially "good" 
regimes may perform "bad" acts, even acts that rise to the level of international crimes. 
As France's experience makes clear, one cannot rely on domestic law-enforcement to 
prosecute perpetrators even where the conduct is abhorrent to the current regime. There 
does not seem to be a coherent rationale, then, for exempting actors of "legitimate" states 
from prosecution for international crimes. 
Moreover, the nature-of-the-regime requirement derives little support from the various 
sources of international law. 59 The closest statement of precedent one can find lies in the 
Charter's limitation of those eligible for prosecution to agents of the Axis powers. Putting 
matters in the best possible light, the Barbie court might have extrapolated from the 
restricted jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal to the nature of crimes against 
humanity generally, interpreting the Charter's specific focus on the Axis powers as implying 
a permanent nature-of-the-regime requirement. But a stringent substantive limitation on 
the sorts of agents that can commit crimes against humanity should not be inferred from 
a mere grant of jurisdiction to a particular tribunal. 
Finally, the nature-of-the-regime requirement cannot even be made fully coherent. 
Depending on how one interprets the court's mysterious phrase "state practicing a political 
system of ideological hegemony," the requirement is either irrelevant to the question of 
crimes against humanity or largely redundant of the intent requirement for such crimes. 
If the phrase implies a criterion of illegitimacy based on general violations of international 
law, the "illegitimate" states might not be the ones whose officials engage in acts targeted 
by the notion of crimes against humanity. For example, an expansionist state with 
hegemonic aspirations could be illegitimate under this test, but it might have no propensity 
to engage in persecution based on race or religion. Conversely, a state which largely 
respected the co-equal sovereignty of other international states could engage in a policy of 
racial or religious persecution of its own population. On the other hand, if the phrase does 
attempt to identify states that practice racial or religious persecution, the nature-of-the­
regime requirement would be unnecessary: The only important function it could serve is 
already served by the mens rea requirement, which limits crimes against humanity to acts 
intended to further a state policy of persecution. 
57. Other commentators appear to agree. See Wexler, supra note 28, at 343. 
58. See id. at 355. 
59. But see Georges Levasseur, Les crimes contre l'humanite et le probleme de leur prescriptior� 93 J. DRoiT lNT'L 
259,271 (1966) (emphasizing that individual act must be reflective of actual state policy for perpetrator to be guilty 
of crimes against humanity). 
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Notice, moreover, that the mens rea formulation of the requirement is preferable to 
the nature-of-the-regime formulation. International law is concerned to prosecute state 
agents who carry out heinous acts in the course of their official duties. \Vhether such acts 
reflect actual state policy is irrelevant. It would be possible, for example, for a state actor 
acting in the course of her official functions to regard herself as carrying out a policy of 
persecution, and thus to satisfy the mens rea requirement, even if no such policy existed. 
The actor, in short, could be mistaken as to the state's actual policy. The nature-of-the­
regime requirement would rule out the prosecution of such "reasonably mistaken" actors, 
but these actors should be eligible for prosecution for crimes against humanity. A crime 
against humanity is a notion of individual, rather than state, responsibility. It is not, 
therefore, the moral standing of the regime that is at issue, but the moral standing of the 
individual in her capacity as state actor. Although the question of ultra vires action, namely 
action which falls outside the scope of an agent's official mandate, will be addressed in 
greater depth below, 6 0  it should be noted here that an individual who was badly mistaken 
about the nature of the state's policy could cease to be a state actor with respect to acts that 
fell under the supposed policy. Not all mistaken conduct, however, is ultra vires. And in 
cases in wh.ich the mistaken official is acting with.in the scope of her authority, she should 
still in principle be eligible for prosecution for crimes against humanity, even where the 
regime itself is not fundamentally evil. 
As one might expect, it was the nature-of-the-regime requirement that provided the 
initial obstacle to liability in the Cour d'appel's preliminary decision in the Touvier case. 
According to that court, the requirement was not satisfied because "if the Vichy regime 
possessed, by the force of circumstances, a certain state policy, it was not in any sense a 
policy of ideological hegemony, in the way in wh.ich we have indicated was the case with 
respect to Nazi Germany." 6 1  There were several aspects to the court's reasoning. It 
argued first that Vichy was a system of political alliances and oppositions, rather than a 
coherent ideology of oppression and racial subordination. 6 2  Anti-Semitism, the court 
maintained, did not reach anywhere near the level in France that it did in Germany.6 3 
Second, the court admitted that the Milice was an organization that had as its goal the 
takeover and militarization of the French government,6 4 and that it did put into practice 
a political program of ideological hegemony. 6 5  But, the court argued, the Milice could not 
have had the takeover of the French state as its goal if the state already shared that ideology, 
that is, if the Milice represented the state as a whole. 6 6  The acts of the Milice thus could 
not have been carried out in the name of the French state and therefore could not 
constitute crimes against humanity. 6 7  In th.is way, the Cour d'appel also disposed of the 
state agency requirement, implying that Touvier could not even be considered an agent of 
Vichy with respect to the killings at Rillieux, on the grounds that the acts of the Milice were 
not acts undertaken on behalf of the state. Further discussion of the agency requirement 
is reserved for the next Part. 
The Cour d'appel thus found as a matter of law that Touvier could not be tried for 
crimes against humanity, since the Vichy regime did not fit the definition of the type of 
60. See infra text accompanying notes 103-107. 
6 1. Judgment of Apr. 13, 1992, 1992 G.P. at 412 (translation from the French). 
62. !d. 
63. Jd. 
64. Id. at 4 13. 
65. !d. 
66. Jd. at 414. 
67. !d. 
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regime required under the Barbie precedent.68 T his court, however, failed to realize what 
the Cour de cassation later did,69 namely that accepting this pronouncement on the nature 
of Vichy did not foreclose conviction in Touvier's case. If, as conceded, the Milice selected 
its victims in virtue of their racial or political status, and if the ideology of the Milice was 
the same ideology under which Germany carried out its crimes, Germany might be thought 
of as the relevant international state in whose name the killings at Rillieux were committed. 
In light of the reluctance of French courts to characterize Vichy as a German bedfellow, the 
surer route to prosecution required an extension of the concept of state agency: Touvier 
could be tried for crimes against humanity as an agent of Germany. In November 1992, 
the Cour de cassation accepted this argument, clearing the way for Touvier's tria\.7° 
T his ruling breaks new ground in international law. The case holds for the first time 
that a public official of one sovereign state can be the agent of another sovereign state, and 
therefore that his acts can be imputed to the second state as acts of that state. The finding 
is all the more remarkable in the face of France's evident reluctance to alter its image of 
Vichy, since a finding that a relatively high-placed Vichy official committed an international 
crime as an agent of the Third Reich ought to impute responsibility to Vichy itself. After 
all, treating Touvier as an agent of Germany does not impugn his agency relation with 
Vichy. Yet the question of state agency with respect to Germany arose in this case precisely 
because French courts were unwilling to identify Vichy as collaborationist. It is true that 
under principles of international law, the Vichy regime can potentially escape international 
responsibility for the acts of its agents if, as the Cour d'appel appeared to be suggesting, 
Vichy agents were acting far outside the scope of their official functions.71 But where the 
state agent is as central to government administration as members of the Milice were, a 
finding of criminal conduct ought at least to raise a presumption of state, in addition to 
individua� responsibility. 
The next Part will attempt to elucidate the basis in international law for the Cour de 
cassation's innovative approach to state agency in the Touvier case. It will argue that this 
approach provides the only coherent understanding of the state agency requirement. 
IV. STATE AGENCY 
Although not an explicit condition under the Charter, the state agency requirement 
follows from the general principle that international law governs relations among states, 
rather than among individuals.72 The traditional reason for restricting the focus of 
international law to nations is that the notion of co-equal sovereignty would be threatened 
if states could prosecute the domestic criminals of other nations. Although sovereignty 
68. Id. at 416. 
69. judgment of Nov. 27, 1992, Cass. crim., 1992 Bull. Crim., No. 394, at 1082 (Fr.). 
70. Id. 
71. See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
205-07 (1994}. 
72. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-93 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); 
see also GERHARD YON GLAHN, LAw AMoNG NATIONS 61-62 (4th ed. 1981); Ian Brownlie, TI1e Place of the 
Individual in International Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 435 (1964}. Further support for this principle lies in the fact that 
only states can appear before the International Court of Justice, whether as plaintiff or as defendant. Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, opened for signature June 26, 1945, art. 34(1}, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993; see 
also Richard B. Bilder, The United States and the World Court in the Post-"C.-old War" Era, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 
251, 252 (1991). 
1 995] CHANGING NOTIONS OF STATE AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 
considerations do not weigh as heavily in international jurisprudence as they once did, 73 
it remains at least politically infeasible for international prosecution to substitute for 
domestic law-enforcement. International prosecution, then, is thought appropriate only 
where the offense was committed by a state through its recognized agents. 
Despite the importance of the requirement, criteria for state agency have never been 
clearly articulated. Moreover, it is not apparent to what specific legal principles one should 
turn for guidance, since sovereignty considerations can dictate the need for the agency 
requirement, but not its form. It is at least clear that domestic law is irrelevant/4 and 
thus that any guidance on the question must be international in nature.75 International 
law, however, has largely failed to address the question of state agency. The Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal incorporates the requirement by saying that the defendant 
must have been "acting in the interests of the European Axis countries."7 6 But the 
Nuremberg prosecutions did not themselves explore the nature of the agency requirement, 
since the defendants were all high-ranking German officials, and their status as state actors 
was never in doubt.7 7 The course of international criminal law since Nuremberg has done 
little to clarify the nature of the requirement.78 
What law there is on the question of state agency focuses on the nature of the offense, 
rather than on the status of the offender. The former approach will be referred to as the 
"act-by-act" approach, since it restricts its attention to the nature of the particular act under 
consideration. This Part will argue instead for what it will refer to as the "status" approach, 
under which the court looks to the wider nature of the agent's status relative to the state 
in question. 
A. T he Act-by-Act Test and Individual Responsibility 
The act-by-act test collapses into what one could call a "lack-of-autonomy" 
requirement. If the offender's relation to the state must be manifest in the act itself, it will 
be impossible to demonstrate that the individual is a state actor unless the state has 
authorized the agent to perform the particular offense in question. Thus, under this 
approach, if the perpetrator decides to perform the act on his own initiative, the act cannot 
be shown to be an act of the state, even if the actor is generally authorized to act for the 
state. On an act-by-act test, then, the actor must display little or no independence of 
judgment in order for the individual to be considered a state actor with respect to the act. 
In most cases, this will mean that the individual must have been acting under orders to 
commit the crime. And although the fact that a defendant was following orders does not 
provide a defense to crimes against humanity, 79 it can be considered in mitigation of 
punishment. 80 T his shows the absurdity of expecting an entire agency relationship to 
manifest itself within the confines of an individual action: In practice, the approach implies 
73. See, e.g., joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" Out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1 7  YALE 
j. lNT'L L. 489 ( 1 992); joel A. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. lNT'L L.j . I ( 1 99 1). 
74. See CHENG, supra note 71, at 207. 
75. See id. at 370-72. 
76. See Nuremburg Charter, supra note 40. 
77. See generally the individual judgments in The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 147-87 (judgment of the 
International Military Tribunal 1946). 
78. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 236. 
79. Article 8 of the Charter provides that "I t]he fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Govern­
ment or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility . . . . " Nuremberg Charter, supra note 40, art. 8. 
so. rd. 
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that any defendant who satisfies the conditions for crimes against humanity can be 
considered for mitigated punishment on the basis of those same conditions. 
In the Touvier case, Touvier could only be convicted of crimes against humanity if he 
received orders to kill the people whose executions he arranged and he knew that they were 
selected on account of their race. He could not be convicted, for example,  if he himsel f  
decided that the victims should all b e  Jewish, even if he  had received orders to  conduct an 
execution, and he certainly could not be held responsible if he had acted on his own 
initiative entirely. The act-by-act test in application to the Touvier case would thus be 
expected to produce the result that Touvier could only be guilty of a crime against 
humanity if he took no initiative for the killings himself, that is, if he were fol lowing orders. 
And this is precisely the conclusion the Cour d 'appel reached in its preliminary ruling: The 
court found that Touvier had operated largely autonomously with respect to the killings 
at Ril lieux, and for tllis reason he could not be considered an agent of any state.81 
As evidenced by the Cour d 'appel's opinion, the act-by-act test not only rules out the 
possibility that Touvier was an agent of Germany. It has the further absurd implication that 
Touvier was not even an agent of France with respect to the killings at Ril l ieux. This is 
because the autonomy Touvier exercised in ordering the killings would have been suffici ent 
under this test to sever his connection to that state as well. Similarly, the test would imply 
that a German official who hand-picked victims on the grounds of race, although acting on 
orders to perform executions, would not be an agent of  Germany, since he would have 
been acting with a certain degree of autonomy. Since on this theory of state responsibility 
there is no basis, outside the particular act under consideration, for l inking French agents 
to the French state and German agents to the German state, high-placed officials and 
anyone  else enjoying a certain measure of autonomy cannot be thought o f  as state agents. 
Although tllis result appears to be a reductio ad absurdum of the act-by-act approach, courts 
have adhered to it nonetheless, even when it required them to exclude the public actions 
of a head of state from the category of state action.82 
Any test of agency which restricts its focus to particular acts will thus be unable to 
allow independence of judgment on the part of state actors to co-exist with full state 
authorization for the acts performed. Indeed, this defect of the approach becomes more 
pronounced the higher up on a chain of  command one looks, since the greater the agent's 
power, the more significant the scope for independent action will be. Requiring the offense 
to fal l  within the parameters of an order from a recognized state official will thus exclude 
offenses committed by actors with greater autonomy from the ambit of  authorized state 
action. And this will be true, not only where the offense is committed by a national of one 
state and the authorizing regime represents a second, independent state. Offenses 
performed by individual members of a single state's hierarchy will be excluded from the 
ambit of state action if an act-by-act test is used. 
The act-by-act test of state agency thus produces profoundly counter-intuitive results. 
The correct test would at least accommodate the moral principle that the more an agent 
initiates a wicked act, the more culpable he is for it. Although at some point on a spectrum 
of initiation, he will cease to represent his state when he acts, there is no reason to suppose 
that point is reached at the first insertion of independent moral judgment. 
81 .  judgment of Apr. 13, 1992, Cour d 'appel de Paris, 1992 G.P.,  No. l ,  at 414 (Fr . ) .  
82 . See discussion of the Marcos cases infra, text accompanying notes 95-108. 
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B. The Act-by-Act Test and State Responsibility 
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Although there is no law on the question of when an individual can be considered a 
state actor for purposes of individual responsibility in international law, there are several 
sources of law on the question of when acts of an individual can be imputed to a state for 
purposes of state responsibility. A number of cases before both the International Court of  
Justice ( ICJ )  and U.S .  courts have turned on the latter question.  In addition, the 
International Law Commission has proposed its Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 
which speak to the question of state responsibility.83 
Although individual and state responsibility have been treated separately, the criteria 
for the two should be the same. Cases of individual responsibility in international law must 
satisfy the state agency requirement, and international states are responsible for the acts of 
their agents. Under the current state of the law, however, there are three types of cases that 
will provide apparent exceptions to the general rule. First, there are the exceptions to the 
state agency requirement for individual responsibility already noted .84 Thus, for example, 
i t  would be possible for an individual to be guilty of an international crime of terrorism, 
and yet for her conduct not to be attributable to an international state. These instances of 
l iability in the absence of an agency relation could be thought of as examples of universal 
jurisdiction on the part of individual nations over certain defendants, rather than as crimes 
which are by their nature international .85 The distinction between crimes of international 
j urisdiction and international crimes, however, may be one without a difference. It might 
be better simply to allow that these forms of individual responsibil ity provide true 
exceptions to the identity of individual and state responsibili ty. 
Second, the extensive principle of sovereign immunity shi elds states from responsibility 
for acts for which individuals might nevertheless bear liability, for example, under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act (ATCA) .86 Unlike the above additional grounds of individual respon­
sibility, however, sovereign immunity does not provide a proper exception, since individual 
responsibility will necessarily be non-international in nature where sovereign immunity 
applies. An individual can only be responsible in her capacity as state actor where the state 
could also be responsible, and this can only be where sovereign immunity is inapplicable .  
Third, there are cases in which individuals may be responsible for acts which they 
perform ultra vires, that is, outside the scope of their official duties which may not be 
attributable to the state. As with the cases of sovereign immunity, however, the exception 
is only apparent, since the form of individual responsibility will not be international in 
nature. A state is responsible for many of the unauthorized acts of its officials, and in such 
cases the individual will be subject to international prosecution as a state agent as well. 
83. Draft Articles I ,  supra note ! ,  arts. l-32; Draft Articles on State Responsibility, arts. 33-35, reprinted in 
Summary Records of the 1 635th Meeting, [ 1980 ] l Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 270, 270-73, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ l980 
[hereinafter Draft Articles II]. 
84. See text accompanying notes 2-4 and sources cited therein. 
85. This appears to be the approach taken by the Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations, which treats 
such crimes as "piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft . . .  " as expanding the reach of a nation's 
domestic laws. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF fOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 cmt. a ( !986): "This section . . . recognize[ s j  
that international law permits any state to  apply its laws to punish certain offenses although the state has no links 
of territory with the offense, or of nationality with the offender (or even the victim)." See also john M. Rogers, 
The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals 'Violate' International Law, 21 VAND. ). TRANSNAT'L L. 47, 48 ( ! 988) 
("to say that commission of an 'international' crime, for instance piracy, is 'in violation of international law' makes 
no sense. Committing the ctime does not result in a violation of one state's obligations to another.") 
86. 28 u.s.c. § 1 350 ( 1 988) . 
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Cases in which the action is not even performed "under color" of state authority will be 
ones in which neither the state nor the individual can be held internationally accoun­
table .87 
Keeping the foregoing real or apparent exceptions in mind, one can attempt to shed 
l ight on the question of individual responsibil ity by considering the more established 
sources of international law on state responsibil ity. The handful of recent cases that have 
spoken to the latter question, however, all apply an act-by-act test. 
In Libya v. United States,88 for example, Judge El-Kosheri of the ICJ argued in a 
dissent that the question of state agency should have been determinative of whether 
international responsibility should lie for the 1 988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight #103 
over Lockerbie, Scotland. The important question, in his view, was whether the 
perpetrators could be treated as agents of the Libyan State. Judge El -Kosheri maintained 
that the fact that the actors were civil servants in Libya did not imply that the acts could 
be attributed to the Libyan government.89 Instead, he wrote that the test should be 
whether the agents "committed their crime upon orders from their governmental 
supervisors or at least with the knowledge and acquiescence of those persons."90 That is, 
he restricted his focus to the particular act under consideration, arguing that the terrorists 
did not appear to have committed the act under orders from superiors, and thus that the 
act bore insufficient evidence of an agency relation. But if the agents had sufficient authori­
zation from the Libyan government to commit acts of this general sort, i t  should be 
irrelevant whether the agents were specifically ordered to destroy flight 103.  It is  not clear 
that other Libyan officials need even have known of plans to commit the offense, as long 
as the  agents themselves who performed it bore the  requisite relation  to the  state and they 
were acting within the expected bounds of that relation. 
The ICJ explici tly endorsed the act-by-act test of state agency in Nicaragua v. United 
States, a suit brought by the government of Nicaragua against the United States for 
terroristic and violent activities of the Nicaraguan rebels.91 Nicaragua claimed that the 
criminal acts of the Contras could be attributed to the United States, on  the grounds that 
the Contras were entirely "recruited, organ ized, paid and commanded" by the U.S .  govern­
ment.n The Court, however, said that " [f )or this conduct to give rise to legal respon­
sibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that State had effective 
control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations 
were committed."93 Although the Court did not elaborate its view of the agency relation, 
Judge Ago articulated the Court's approach to state agency in a concurrence, saying  that 
state agency can only be imputed "in cases where certain members of [the Contras] 
happened to have been specifically charged by United States authorities to commit a particular 
act, or carry out a particular task of some kind on behalf of the United States."94 
Most recently, the act-by-act approach has been used to limit the scope of  a head of  
state's agency relation to  the state he governs. In a class action suit brought against the 
estate of Ferdinand Marcos by victims of human rights abuses in the Phil ippines during his 
87. See RESTATEMENT (TH IRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 207 ( 1 986). 
88. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971  Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1 992 !.C.). 1 14, 1 99 (Provisional Measures Order of Apr. 1 4 )  (EI-Kosheri, 
)., d issenting). 
89. Id. at 202. 
90. !d. 
9 1 .  Mi li tary and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1 986 ! .C.). 1 4  (June 27). 
92. !d. at 64, para. 1 1 4. 
93. !d. at 64-65, para. 1 15 (emphasis added). 
94. !d. at 1 8 1 ,  1 88-89, para. 16 (separate opinion of Judge Ago) (em phasis added) . 
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tenure (Estate II), the Ninth Circuit held that Marcos was not responsible as an agent or 
instrumentality of the Philippine state for his acts as head of state.95 The court explained 
that Marcos was not "an absolute autocrat,"96 but instead a head of state bound by laws, 
and that where his actions violated the law, they could not be considered acts of the 
state.97 The court thus maintained that actions performed in violation of a sovereign's 
legal powers are individual ,  rather than sovereign, actions.98 Similarly in an earlier case 
(Estate I), the Ninth Circuit had found that Marcos' daughter, Imee Marcos-Manatoc, in 
charge of a portion of the military police in the Philippines, was also not acting in her 
official capacity when she authorized numerous acts of violence.99 The court held that 
because Marcos-Manatoc exercised a reasonable degree of autonomy, her acts were not 
within her official mandate and were therefore not the acts of  the Philippine state for 
purposes of sovereign irrununity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). l00 
These holdings are the natural but unfortunate consequence of the act-by-act test of 
state agency. They are another manifestation of the idea that an agent must have been 
following orders for his act to be an act of the state. In Estate II, the statutory mandate to 
which Marcos was subj ect plays the role of  the required command:  Marcos' actions cannot 
be thought of as state action unless they were directly authorized, and for a head of state, 
authorization can only come from the laws under which he is bound to govern. But surely 
these cases provide a clue that something has gone badly wrong: A test of  state agency 
should not produce the result that the actions of heads of state and high government 
officials, conducted in the course of state governance and "under color" of state authority 
are removed from the category of state action and relegated to the domain of private action.  
Abuse of power should not turn state action into private violence .  
Enlarging the scope of governmental responsibility under the  current state of  the law 
would have the undesirable consequence of enlarging the reach of sovereign irrununity 
under U.S. laws, since the only exceptions to sovereign immunity are restricted to the few 
listed in the FSIA. l01 But the present convoluted method of l imiting sovereign immunity 
by artificially excluding large portions of official behavior from the scope of state action is 
ultimately untenable. Not only does it contort legal reasoning in cases implicating the 
FSIA, but it has unfortunate implications for other areas of  the law which involve state 
agency, to which its impact on international criminal law attests. A more coherent solution, 
95. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1 467, 1 472-74 (9th Cir. 1 994), cert. denied, 1 15 S. Ct. 934 
( 1995) .  The court did find that it had j urisdiction over him as a private citizen. Id. 
96. Id. at 1 47 1 .  
97. Id. The court instead assumed jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 2 8  U.S.C. § 1350 ( 1988). 
U nfortunately, against the background of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ( FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1 602- 1 1 
( 1988), the court could not have had jurisdiction over the Marcos estate without finding that Marcos' acts were 
not acts of the state, since Marcos would have been immune to prosecution under the FSIA if his acts had been 
judged to be acts of state. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germ., 26 F.3d 1 166, 1 1 73-74 (D.C. Cir. 1 994) 
(holding that the waiver exception of the FSIA does not apply to jus cogens violations generally); Siderman de Blake 
v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 7 1 9  (9th Cir. 1992) ("[A] violation of jus cogens does not confer jurisdiction 
under the FSIA."). 
98. 25 F.3d at 1 470. 
99. In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 497-98 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 1 1 3 S. Ct. 2960 
( 1993). 
1 00. Again, the court found it had jurisdiction over the defendant as a private citizen under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act. Jd. 
1 0 1 .  Jd. 
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and one called for by a number of scholars, would be to extend the exceptions to immunity 
under the FSIA. 102 
C. Tile Status Approach to State Agency: A Proposal 
The most salient feature of the agent-state relationship is a set of shared expectations 
between the agent on the one hand and the state or its recognized agents on  the other. In 
particular, an agency relationship arises when both the agent and the state regard the agent 
as accountable to the state for purposes of carrying out the state's policies. What is of 
greatest reievance to state agency, then, is the existence of a shared understanding that the 
agent has assumed a certain type of accountability to the state. 
Accountability need not be based on a relationship of superior to inferior. A group 
of individuals, for example, embarked on a j oint venture tend to regard themselves as 
accountable to one another, even if all members of the group enj oy the same status. 
Moreover, accountability can obtain whether or not the agent is a national of the state .  
National ity would appear to have little or  no bearing on the matter. Nor  should physical 
presence on the state's territory be in itself a relevant consideration .  The fact that an 
individual was a German national, for example,  living in Berlin during the Third Reich does 
not help to establish that person as an agent of the German state .  Similarly, that an 
individual was not a German national and was not living in Germany should not preclude 
her from having an agency relationship with Germany. Nor does the fact that an actor was 
an official in the state government definitively establish state agency, since official status 
does not entail a shared expectation of agent-accountability with respect to all matters. 
Official status may create a presumption of state agency, but it should be possible for an 
agent's duties to be sufficiently circumscribed that the necessary element of shared expecta­
tions of accountability of the agent to the state is limited to certain spheres of  activity. On  
the other hand, that a person d i d  n o t  have a n  official position in the  state's bureaucracy 
should not create a presumption that the individual was not a state actor, since mutual 
expectations can easily develop outside  of official bureaucratic channels.  
On a status approach, the higher up on a chain of command one moves, the stronger 
will be the presumption of agency and the broader the scope of the agency powers. The 
limiting case is the nearly total accountability of the head of state. Although purely 
personal actions by a head of state need not be thought of as state action, any action 
undertaken in the public arena by a head of state should be considered state action.  That 
an act was contrary to law thus should not stand as grounds for excluding it from the 
sphere of state action.  Although it is possible for a head of state to commit a crime as a 
purely private actor, most crimes committed by members of a ruling party utilize official 
channels and state power for their commission. International responsibility for such crimes 
should not be easily evaded by devices that attempt to transform them into private acts. 
102. As courts and commentators have pointed out, the structure of the FSIA makes little sense, since the Act 
allows an exception to sovereign immunity for violations involving commercial activity but not for grave human 
rights violations. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germ., 813 F.Supp.  22, 26 (D.D.C. 1 992) (holding that the FSIA 
"has no role to play where the claims alleged involve undisputed acts of barbarism"), rev'd 26 F.3d 1 166, 1 184-85 
(D.C. Cir. 1 994) (Wald, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the only way to interpret the FSIA in accordance with 
international law is to construe the Act to encompass an implied waiver exception for jus cogens violations"); see 
also Joan Fitzpatrick, The Future of the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1 789: Lessons From In Re Marcos Human Rights 
Litigation, 67 ST. JoH N's L. REv. 491 ( 1 993); Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment, Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A 
Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International Law, 7 CAL L. REv. 365 ( 1 989) 
(arguing that the FSIA should itself be understood as allowing an exception to sovereign immunity in cases of grave 
hu rnan rights abuses ) .  
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The status approach to state agency must be understood as accompanied by a certain 
approach to the question of ultra vires conduct. Under the status approach, the scope of 
ultra vires action will be relative to the scope of the agent's grant of authority. The more 
general the grant of authority to an agent, the more difficult it becomes to argue that the 
agent was acting ultra vires, since the broader the category of official acts would be. The 
status approach would thus shrink the domain of ultra vires conduct overall ,  in keeping 
with its significant expansion of the scope of state action for upper-level officials. The 
agent's sphere of international responsibility, then, would depend on the understanding that 
obtained between the individual and the state regarding the individual's role in furthering 
state policies. Thus a state might choose to extend authority to an agent only for purposes 
of accomplishing a discrete task. In this case, the act-by-act approach and the status 
approach would result in the same inquiry, and the sphere of state action for that agent 
would be limited to the particular act for which he was engaged.  Although the scope of 
state action for an individual engaged for a limited purpose would itself be limited, a state's 
responsibility should increase with the generality of its grant of authority to the agent. The 
act-by-act approach appears to produce the opposite result: It  diminishes the domain of 
state action and similarly augments that of ultra vires action as the l evel of autonomy on 
the par t  of the agent increases. The status approach, by contrast, would include al l  but the 
most private and personal of actions in the category of state action for actors whose grant 
of authority allows for a sign ificant degree of autonomous action. 103 
This approach to ultra vires conduct suggested by the status approach is largely 
consistent with that of the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations. 104 Section 207, which 
addresses the question of state responsibility for the acts of its agents, provides that " [a] 
state is responsible for any violation of its obligations under international law resulting 
from action or inaction by . . .  any organ, agency, official, employee, or other agent of a 
government or of any political subdivision, acting within the scope of authority or under 
color of such authority."105 Comment d, which defines the "scope and color of authority," 
goes on to say: 
A state is responsible for acts of officials and official bodies, national or local, 
even if the acts were not authorized by or known to the responsible national 
authorities, indeed if expressly forbidden by law, decree or instruction. In 
determining whether an act was within the authority of an official or an official 
body, or was done under color of such authority . . .  one must consider all the 
circumstances, including whether the affected parties reasonably considered the 
action to be official, whether the action was for public purpose or for private 
gain, and whether the persons acting wore official uniforms or used official 
equi pmen t.l06 
1 03.  P roperly speaking, there are four categories of action as related to state agency: ( 1) purely private acts 
which bear no relation to any state but which do not contravene either domestic or international laws (e.g., the 
sovereign brushing his teeth) ;  (2) purely p rivate acts of a state official which the official is not authorized to 
perform (e.g., the Secretary of State goes on a shooting spree); (3) state acts of a state official which the official is 
authorized to perform; and (4) state acts of a state official which the official is not authorized to perform, but 
which nevertheless are performed "under color of authority." I t  is this last category that has proven difficult for 
purposes of both sovereign immuni ty and conduct which is ultra vires. It is also for thi s  category of acts that the 
act-by-act and the status approaches provide sharply divergent answers. 
1 04. RESTATEMENT (TH IRD) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS (1986). 
105. Id. a t § 207 cmt. c (emphasis added). 
106. Jd. at  cmt. d. 
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The Restatement approach makes clear that individual actions need not be specifi cally 
authorized in order to count as state action. What matters instead is that the acts are 
performed under color of authority. This test implies a status approach to state agency, 
because determining whether the acts are performed under color of authority, when the acts 
are not specifically authorized, will require general consideration of the nature of the 
individual's relation to the state. The approach is necessarily a flexible one, exploring 
factors such as the agent's motivation for the act, as well as the appearance of the actor. 
The resulting category of ultra vires action is likely to be much narrower than on an act-by­
act approach, restricting non-international conduct to that which IS truly private in 
nature. l07 
The status approach to individual responsibil i ty is also consistent  with the ILC's 
approach to state responsibility. 108 Article 8 of the Draft Articles attributes to the state 
the conduct of persons acting on its behalf. 109 No exception is made for agents acting 
in violation of the laws of the state. Article 5 provides that the conduct of any organ 
recognized under that state's law as a state organ "shall be considered as an act of the state 
concerned under international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the 
case in question."1 10 Thus, official status is not dispositive under the Draft Articles: An 
organ officially recognized under the internal laws of the state may in certain cases be acting 
outside the scope of its official capacity. Similarly, Article 7, section  2 provides: 
The conduct of an organ of an entity which is not part of the formal structure 
of the State or of a territorial government entity, but which is empowered by the 
internal law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority, 
shall also be considered as an act of the State under international l aw, provided 
that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question. l 1 1  
Thus, an individual lacking an official position may b e  engaged b y  a state to act o n  its 
behalf, and the actions of that agent will be the actions of the state if the agent was acting 
in the capacity for which she was engaged. 
It is important to stress the difference between the approach proposed here, which 
draws support from the ILC's recommendations for state responsibility, and the more 
standard approach to the state agency of individuals, exemplified by the 1 992 lower court 
ruling in the Touvier case. While the Touvier court was concerned with the actor's relation 
1 07. Section 702 of the Restatement appears to p resent an exception to the broad approach to state agency 
of § 207 for human rights violations which are not also breaches of treaty obligations. After citing to the state 
responsibility provision of § 207, Comment b of § 702 states: 
The violations of human rights cited in this section [§ 702] ,  however, are violations of customary 
international law only if practiced, encouraged, or condoned by the government of a state as official 
policy. A state is not responsible under this section for a violation of human rights by an official that 
was not authorized, encouraged, or condoned by the responsible governmental authorities of the state. 
Jd. at § 702 cmt. b. The Restatement thus appears to retreat from its broad conception of state responsibility 
uniquely with respect to human rights violations. The approach to individual agency suggested in this Article maps 
onto the more general approach to state agency found in § 207 and would accordingly eliminate the exception 
found in § 702. 
108. See generally Draft Articles I, supra note I. 
1 09. The article provides: "The conduct of a person or group of persons shall also be considered as an act 
of the State under international law if: (a) it is established that such person or group of persons was in fact acting 
on behalf of that State . . . .  " Id. art. 8. 
1 10. Id. art. 5. 
I l l . Id. art. 7(2). 
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to the state with respect to a particular act, the present approach requires no interaction 
between an individual and the state on the level of  the act. The important question on the 
status approach is whether the agent has a general grant of authority to act for the state, 
and if so, whether the agent was acting in his capacity as state agent under that grant. The 
idea of general, as opposed to act-by-act authorization, squares with the suggestion that the 
agent and the state must have shared expectations about the role of the agent with respect 
to the state. If the individual regards himself as accountable to the state government, and 
the government in turn regards the agent as responsive to it, whether the agent was 
specifically directed, or even more generally authorized to perform the act in question 
would appear to be irrelevant, as long as the agent was acting within his official capacity. 
Consider the application of the status approach to the Touvier case.  The question is 
whether Germany authorized Touvier to act on its behalf. Suppose for the sake of . 
argument that Touvier had little or no contact with German officials himself, but that he 
was ordered by De Bourmont who maintained regular contact with the Germans. It is  
surely not necessary for Touvier to have been directly authorized to act on Germany's 
behalf; it should suffice if De Bourmont, or whoever might have been first in l ine, was 
directly authorized by Germany and that De Bourmont authorized Touvier to act. At l east 
this analysis is sound if the grant of authority to De Bourmont were suffici ently general that 
it fel l  within the scope of his duties to authorize others to act. It is sufficient that Vichy 
officials were empowered to act for Germany; the l esser officials they empower need not 
themselves have had contact with Third Reich officials. The next question is whether Vichy, 
or the Vichy officials from whom Touvier derived his authority, had the requisite 
relationship with Germany. There are three  theories under which an agency relationship 
could be found to exist. First, the acts in question would be attributable to Germany if 
Germany specifically directed or engaged Milice officials to commit the murders. This 
would be an instance of the sort of l imited agency relationship a state can create on a one­
time basis by engaging an individual to perform a particular task. This theory is reflected 
in the Draft Articles, which allows that a government can empower an organ of another 
state to act under its authority without controlling the state of which the organ is an official 
part: 
The conduct of an organ of an entity which is not part of the formal structure 
of the State or of a territorial governmental entity, but which is empowered by 
the internal law of that State to exercise elements of  the governmental authority, 
shall also be considered as an act of the State under international law, provided 
that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question. 1 12 
This basis for enlarging responsibility would be most appropriate in a situation in which 
an isolated organization within a state attempted to break away from its own government 
with the assistance and collaboration of an outside  enemy. If sufficient collaboration 
obtained between the organization and the other state, the latter could be internationally 
accountable for the acts of the organization. If, for example, Germany had independent 
relations with the Milice, and had specifically engaged it to perform certain tasks, the actions 
of the Milice would be actions attributable to Germany under this provision. 
Second, even if French officials undertook the killings at Rillieux on their own 
initiative, Germany can be held responsible for the event if it exercised general control over 
1 1 2 .  Draft Articles !, supru note l, art. 7(2) .  
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the conduct o f  Vichy officials. I t  would not b e  necessary, under this theory, for a legal 
relationship to exist in order to establish an agency relation ben.veen the two countries. 
This theory of agency is reflected in Article 28 of the Draft Articles: 
An internationally wrongful act committed by a S tate in a field of activity in 
which that State is subj ect to the power of direction or control of ano ther S tate 
entails the international responsibility of that o ther State . 1 1 3 
Under Article 28,  if Vichy was subject to " the power of direction or control" of  Germany, 
then any internationally wrongful acts of Vichy are attributable to Germany. On the 
proposed analysis, this would subject individual officials of Vichy to international criminal 
liability as German agents. This theory of agency would be appropriate for a situation in 
which the upper echelon of the Vichy regime had effectively collapsed into the ad� 
ministration of the Third Reich. If Vichy officials relied on a grant of authority of German 
officials for their power and status, French officials would all be German officials for 
purposes of international law. The distinction ben.veen the n.vo regimes would have 
dissolved. 
Third, under the Draft Articles it is possible for a state to be responsible for the 
internationally wrongful acts of another state if the first state assists the second state in 
commi tting these acts: 
Aid or assistance by a State to ano ther State, if it is established that it is rendered 
for the commission of an internationally wrongful act carried out by the latter, 
itself constitutes an internationally wrongful act, even if, taken alone, such aid 
or assistance would not constitute the breach of an international obl igation. 1 14 
This provision establishes the concept of joint liability among states under international law. 
Under this approach, it would not be necessary to decide whether Touvier was an agent of  
Germany. Vichy would be responsible for aiding Germany in the  commission of 
internationally wrongful acts, and Vichy officials could be tried for crimes against humanity 
as authors of those acts. In this way, it would be possible for acts of a Vichy state actor to 
be done " in the name" or "on behalf" of Germany, without those acts having been 
performed by someone who is himself an agent of Germany. 
As discussed in Part II, there is every reason to suppose that Vichy carried out  a policy 
of vicious persecution of Jews and political resistants without prompting from Germany, 
and that the Vichy regime fully shared Germany's ideology.l15  In light of this history, 
it is probable that Vichy was a willing assistant in Germany's genocidal p lans. Had i t  not 
been determined to put Vichy on a different moral plane from the Third Reich, the Touvier 
court would have had ample basis for finding that Vichy was a state "practicing a political 
system of ideological hegemony."1 16 It appears, however, to be psychologically expedient 
for French courts to avoid gazing on Vichy's own policies of persecution with a cold eye, 
since such an assessment would produce the inevitable conclusion that Vichy was as 
motivated to eradicate its Jewish population as was the Third Reich. Indeed, the inde� 
pendent enthusiasm with which Vichy embraced anti-Semi tism, and i ts resulting moral 
independence from Nazi Germany, seem to provide the very conditions that make 
dispassionate assessment of Vichy's culpability impossible. Vichy's racist agenda would be 
I 13 .  Id. art .  28( 1 ) .  
I 1 4 .  Jd. art. 27(2). 
1 1 5 .  See supra text accompanying notes 8-16.  
1 1 6 .  judgment of Apr. i 3 ,  1 992, Cour d'ap pel de P a ris, 1 992 G.P. ,  No. ! ,  at 4 1 4  (Fr. ) .  
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all the easier for France to  face if i t  could be  understood as the mere implementation of 
another country's ideology. 
lf one works within the constraints imposed by the French courts and accepts that 
Vichy does not fit the required definition of an i l legitimate regime, the collaboration 
between Vichy and the Third Reich nevertheless supports the existence of an agency 
relationship between Touvier and Germany under the third of the theories outlined 
above. 11 7 Starting in 1 942, the Vichy government made a series of agreements with the 
Germans that formalized the cooperation of Vichy in deporting Jews to Nazi concentration 
camps in exchange for various French police privileges. 1 18 Apart from suiting its own 
anti-Semitic ideology, these agreements benefited Vichy by creating political clout with 
Germany. 1 19 If Vichy's persecution of the Jews does not qualify it as an i l legitimate state 
in its own right, the l evel of assistance it afforded Germany provides the basis for treating 
the Vichy regime as an accomplice . The acts of its agents are acts performed "on behalf  
of" Germany. 
Between 1 942 and 1 944, Vichy increasingly came under the power of the Third 
Reich . 1 2o On November 29,  1 943, Petain, who had shown a desire to maintain France's 
status as an independent and sovereign nation, was ordered to step down by Otto Abetz, 
a high German official stationed in Paris. Abetz's order also stated that all French laws 
would henceforth have to be submitted to the occupying powers in the North for approv­
aJ .m Petain was replaced by Laval, who was willing to bow entirely to the Nazis, m 
and who, from December 1 943 unti l  August 1 944, headed the Vichy regime entirely on his 
own. 123 During this period, Laval took orders directly from Abetz, and all vestiges of 
independence from Germany were eliminated.l24 
During this period of increasing German control ,  the second theory outlined 
above125 might be a more appropriate basis for regarding Vichy officials as agents of 
Germany than that provided by the prosecution. The Germans had de facto control over 
the day-to-day operations of the Vichy regime, and the State was effectively absorbed into 
the occupying powers in the North. 126 Since the killings at Rill ieux took place in 1 944, 
this is probably the most accurate theory under which to regard Touvier as an agent of 
Germany. It should be noted, moreover, that this state of affairs could not be used as a 
basis for denying Vichy's responsibility, since, as already mentioned, it is not a defense to 
an international criminal prosecution that the defendant was following orders_ 127 
Finally, the first theory outlined above128 would appear to be the least appropriate 
to the circumstances surrounding Touvier's crime. There is no evidence that collaboration 
with the Germans was restricted to certain organizations in the Vichy regime alone, or that 
the relations between the Milice and the Germans did not characterize the State as a whole .  
I t  should be noted, however, that arguments made at trial tending to show the relative 
1 1 7.  See supra text accompanying note 1 1 4. 
1 18 .  See WEBSTER, supra note 8, at  1 07- 1 4. 
J 1 9 .  Jd. at 107-08. 
120. See generally MA RRUS & PAXTON, supra note 6, at 281-340. 
1 2 1 .  fRAN<;O IS-GEO RGES DREYFUS, H ISTO IRE DE VICHY 732-33 ( 1 990). 
1 22. WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 174.  
1 23. See id. at  1 74, 1 98. 
1 24. D REYFUS, supra note 1 2 1 ,  at 750-52. 
125. See supra text accompanying note 1 1 3. 
1 26. See supra text accompanying notes 109- 1 1 2. 
1 27. See Nuremberg Charter, supm no te 40, art. 8 .  
128.  See supru text accompanying note 1 1 2 .  
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anomalousness of high level collaboration between elements in Vichy and the German state 
could stil l  allow a finding of state agency under this theory. 
It would appear, then, that there are at least two theories under which Touvier could 
be thought of as an agent of Germany with respect to the killings at Ril l ieux:  He was an 
agent of Germany either because he belonged to an organ of the Vichy regime which 
afforded significant assistance to the Nazi government, or because the Nazi regime exerted 
a high level of control and direction over the daily operations of the Vichy government. 
V. CoNcLUSION 
If crimes against humanity are to be tried on the territory on which the criminal acts 
occurred, the important psychological and political stake local courts have in the outcome 
of the proceedings dictates a rethinking of the criteria for state agency. Requiring a court 
to offer an extremely unflattering portrait of its own historical legacies in order to find one 
of its nationals guilty of crimes against humanity creates unnecessary obstacles to the 
successful prosecution of such cases, at least in situations in which there is more than a 
single  regime involved in the implementation of a common persecutive program. 
The notion of state agency receives inconsistent and sometimes incoherent treatment. 
It is apparently all too tempting for courts, both in France and in the United States, to 
tai lor the concept to suit the needs of a particular case. An approach to state agency based 
on the status of the actor, rather than on piecemeal evaluation of his behavior on an act-by­
act basis would allow international law to develop consistently in this area. It would also 
provide the broadest foundation for conducting international prosecutions for human rights 
violations consistent with sovereignty restrictions. It would thus allow international 
condemnation to play a more significant role in efforts to hold perpetrators of  wide -spread 
atrocities accountable for their actions. 
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VI. APPENDIX: THE LESSER EVIL 
Touvier claimed that he was faced with a choice of evils: allow De Bourmont to kill 
thirty Jews in revenge for the killing of Henriot, or implement his own plan to kill seven, 
which, he believed, would pacify the German desire for revenge equally wel l .  Touvier's 
claim, then, is that but for his intervention, thirty Jews would have been killed, rather than 
seven. Touvier argues, therefore, that he should be thanked for saving twenty-three, rather 
than tried for the murder of seven. If the facts were as Touvier claimed, should he have 
a justification of necessity? 
The defense of necessity has generally been understood as requiring, at a minimum, 
that the threatened harm which the actor chose to avoid was imminent and certain, that the 
threatened harm would be worse than the harm chosen, and that the threatened harm could 
not have been avoided by any other means. Several of these elements appear in Article 3 3  
o f  the Draft Articles on State Responsibility on "state o f  n ecessity" defenses, which provides 
that the harm must represent "a grave and imminent p eriJ ." 129 The "effectiveness" re­
quirement-that the chosen act was the o nly effective means for avoiding the harm in 
question-is also reflected in Draft Article 3 3 ,  which says that it must be the case that "the 
act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the State"t30 against the 
threatened peril . 
This condition is also incorporated in an article dealing with another sort of defense 
under intentional law, the defense of "distress." Article 32 provides that the wrongfulness 
of an act is precluded if the actor acting on behalf of the state "had no other means, in a 
situation of extreme distress, of saving his life or that of persons entrusted to his care." 131 
And since Touvier was in charge of Jewish and political prisoners of the Milice in the region 
to which he was assigned, he might attempt a defense of distress, citing the lives of the 
twenty-three prisoners he allegedly "saved" from execution. 
With respect to a possible necessity defense, there is no question that the gravity 
requirement is satisfied. It also seems reasonably clear that the harm threatened is worse 
than the harm chosen, since presumably the death of thirty is worse than the death of 
seven. l32 It is doubtful, however, that the imminence requirement is satisfied. Touvier 
would have had to present evidence that the German action was immediately forthcoming, 
as well as evidence bearing on the certainty of the event. Suppose, however, he could meet 
these two requirements. The real problem with the necessity defense lies in satisfying the 
effectiveness requirement. It would be difficult to demonstrate that there was no other way 
to cause the Nazis to desist from their purpose when the threatened harm was to take place 
on non-occupied territory, largely under the control of the Vichy regime. Touvier's claim 
that he and De Bourmont were able to convince the Germans to leave the matter in French 
hands would rend to undercut any such argument. 
129. Draft Articles II, supra note 83, art 33(l)(a). 
130. Id. Compare the approach of the MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 3.02 ( 1 962) (requiring that the actor believed 
the act to be "necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another"). 
131. Draft Articles I, supra note I, art. 32 (1). 
132. Philosophers, however, have debated whether the death of a larger number of persons should be thought 
of as a worse state of affairs than the death of a smaUer number. See generally John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers 
Count?, 6 P �I I L. & Pus.  AFF. 293 (1977). The argument that it might not be rests on the claim that h uman lives 
are incommensurable (i.e. their worth cannot be compared), and thus the evil represented by the loss of human 
life is not additive. 
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It seems, at any rate, impossible to demonstrate that executing seven Jews was 
reasonably perceived as an effective way to prevent the Nazis from carrying out their 
threatened plan. Touvier presents the fact that Nazis did not take any reprisals against Jews 
after the killings at Rillieux as evidence that his supposition was correct . 133 But first, this 
fact is perhaps better evidence that the Germans intended no such action in the first place. 
Second, even if  the killings at Rillieux did cause the Nazis to alter their plans, it was not 
reasonable to think this method would have been an effective means for acco mplishing that end. 
If the Germans in fact wanted to avenge the death of Henriot by executing a hundred Jews, 
there is no reason to suppose they would have been satisfied by the execution of seven. 
And if it was reasonable to suppose they would have been satisfied with the murder of 
seven, it might also have been reasonable to suppose they would have been satisfied with 
the murder of three, or perhaps with persecutions short of murder. Finally, even if 
Touvier's supposed reasoning at the time subsequently did prove accurate, he should not 
be able to take credit for wild guesses which turn out to be correct. 
The same effectiveness considerations that make the defense of necessity questionable 
in this situation would make the defense of distress inapplicable as well . Even on the 
extremely unlikely hypothesis that Touvier was attempting to save the lives of  those 
entrusted to his care under circumstances of extreme distress, it would again be impossible 
to show that Touvier had adequate grounds for thinking his method effective. If one were 
to accept a defense of this sort to the crime of murder, the agent, whose own life is not at 
stake, would have to be certain both that the feared greater evil would result if he did not 
act, and that the killing he undertook in order to avert the greater evil would successfully 
avert it. In this case, Touvier could not p lausibly have demonstrated either. 
The deeper and more interesting question is unfortunately beyond the scop e  of  this 
Article .  Suppose Touvier had been able to demonstrate that the kill ings were both 
n ecessary to avert greater slaughter and that they would be effective at doing so. S hould 
n ecessity or some sort of  "distress" defense be permitted as a defense to intentional kill ing? 
Purifying what is now a difficult ethical situation of epistemic doubt does not eliminate all 
moral discomfort. It  brings us face to face with the intuition that the event which is my 
intentionally destroying a human life may be in some ways worse than the event which is an 
ending of a human life, from whatever source. And it may be, therefore, that although I 
might very much prefer that an earthquake would kill three human beings rather than five, 
I may legitimately not prefer the death of three over the death of five if I must effectuate 
the death of the three in order to save the additional two. The preference, and the 
intuition that it is legitimate, can only rest on the fact that the death of  the three under 
these circumstances may be an event which is not legitimately mine to choose, even though 
it may be better that three die than that five die. I may not, therefore, be able to claim the 
benefit of a justification where I do choose it. If it is my life that is at stake, it might seem 
more reasonable to allow me a defense under the circumstances. But presumably the 
applicable defense in this case would be an excuse, and excuse is not the appropriate defense 
for agents who perform disinterested acts for the sake of the common good.D4 
1 33. Judgment of Apr. 1 3, 1 992, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1992 G.P., No. 1, at 406 (Fr.). 
134.  See generally Claire Finkelstein, Self-Defense As a 'Rational Excuse': Accommodating Relations of 
Domination, U. PITT. L. REv. (forthcoming 1995); Claire Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense 
in Law, 37 U. ARIZ. L. REv. 251  ( 1 995) .  

